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Abstract
This project investigates whether financial liberalization increases corruption on a global level.
Arguments put forward by international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF claim
that financial globalization will reduce corruption. However, the experience of India suggests
that opening up financial markets might have increased corruption. This project tests whether
this experience is generalizable worldwide. I find evidence for the conjecture that financial liber-
alization increased corruption in a panel analysis using random effects and lagged independent
variable.
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Introduction
”The longer I live, the more I feel that the individual is not so much to blame - not
even the worst individuals, not even the ’best’ citizens - as the system of corruption
which has grown up about us, and which rewards an honest man with a mere living
and a crook with all the magnificence of our magnificent modern life.”
- Lincoln Steffens
1.1 Introduction
After India implemented repressive financial policies, it observed a below-par economic growth
compared to China and the East Asian counterparts. At the same time, India experienced
rampant government corruption, as it involved a great deal of state intervention in the economy,
thereby magnifying the importance of the discretionary decisions taken by bureaucrats who
are corruptible. India launched its liberalization policies in the late 1980’s, with the purpose
of giving markets a central role in the growth of the economy. These policies also increased
anticipation for lesser government corruption and better governance. However, India’s experience
was contradictory. Government corruption increased with prominent money laundering cases
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coming into the limelight. Does this mean that financial liberalization increased corruption in
the Indian context? If yes, is it a generalizable phenomenon?
In the last quarter of the 20th century, a wave of economic liberalization policies transpired in
many parts of the world. Liberalization policies diminish rules and regulations on the economy,
reducing government’s role in intervening in the markets, letting the private sector pursue their
interests more freely. Financial liberalization constitutes one dimension of this multifaceted
policy which also facilitates a greater integration of the financial markets across borders. It is
a complementary advancement to globalization, is even referred to as financial globalization
by some economists. Initially, the excitement of this phenomenon drew academics to study the
implications of these policies. Soon they realized that liberalization policies increased capital
and financial flows across borders, which lead to volatility, and in this environment, the role of
the state in establishing stability was of utmost importance.
State’s responsibility is to maintain law and order and protect people and their public inter-
ests. Sometimes, these responsibilities are not met, like in the case of government corruption.
Government corruption is broadly defined as the abuse of public office for private gain (World
Bank, 1997, p.102). According to the World Bank, public corruption is “the single greatest ob-
stacle to economic and social development. It undermines development by distorting the role of
law and weakening the institutional foundation on which economic growth depends.” (Trans-
parency International, About, n.d). While hardly anyone would disagree that governments hold
responsibilities of establishing good governance by reducing corruption, there is disagreement
as to whether or to what extent they have the responsibility of intervening in the financial
markets.The state intervention in the financial markets is a long-standing and ongoing debate.
Historically, governments have always intervened in the financial sectors by imposing capital con-
trols, interest rate controls, directing credit and so on. While neoliberal economists may term
this as financial repression, others hold the view that certain levels of intervention are necessary
for maintaining stability.
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Several global financial crises in some countries that followed in the aftermath of liberalization
alarmed many policymakers about the potential negative impacts of liberalization. The primary
concern was that it might give the banks the freedom to take on excessive risk, causing financial
fragility. The quality of political institutions plays a vital role in determining the impact of finan-
cial liberalization. Asli Demirg-Kunt, Enrica Detragiache [1998] studied the effect of financial
liberalization on financial fragility. Their seminal study highlighted that stronger institutional
quality made crises less likely. Also, it has been suggested that financial liberalization may im-
pact the quality of institutions themselves [Kose et al., 2009; Blackburn et al., 2010; Graeff and
Mehlkop 2003]. Financial globalization has posed new challenges to the state. As a result, it
needs to re-evaluate its role in accommodating stable economic growth constantly. A group of
senior World Bank economists, led by Ahyan Kose, in their highly influential paper Financial
Globalization: A Reappraisal, say the following,
“There is evidence that poor public governance (as measured by severity of bureaucratic
corruption or lack of government transparency) discourages inward FDI and portfolio equity
inflows. But whether the prospect of more inflows has actually led to improvements in public
governance remains an open question”(Kose et al., 2009, p.45).
In this paper, the World Bank economists continue by claiming that financial liberalization
has collateral impacts that may improve institutional quality (Kose et al., 2009). Its a claim
made by many [Levine, 2005], but as they admit not much research has been done to unravel the
relationship. Simultaneously, other economists have argued the opposite. For instance, Blackburn
at.al [2010] theoretically hypothesize that financial liberalization may, in fact, increase corruption
levels. Basing their arguments on several other significant findings, such as Graeff and Mehlkop
[2003],1 they hypothesize channels through which corrupt officials find new ways to perpetuate
their actions in a liberalized environment. This project aims to provide insight into this area,
by empirically testing whether greater financial integration through liberalization help or hurt
institutions, more specifically, government corruption.
1Graeff and Mehlokop [2003] show that economic freedom rises corruption in developing countries
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The experience of India might make a compelling case to investigate a global pattern in this
regard. India has a rich history of employing many financially repressive policies, and it has
gradually implemented liberalization policies. Many economists have criticised Indian economic
history for its repressive state policies in the second half of the 20th century, that is understood
to have caused below-par economic growth (Demetriades.et al, 1996). In the 1950s, India had
reasonably liberal policies with not much state intervention in the market. Only after the 1960s,
“government tightened its control over the financial system by introducing lending rate controls,
higher liquidity requirements, and by establishing state development banks for industry and
agriculture. This process culminated in the nationalization of the 14 largest commercial banks
in 1969” (Demetriades et al., 1997, p.311) Later, in the 1980’s interest rate ceilings were rigidly
applied.
The critique of such policies began with the seminal argument made by Mckinnon and Shaw.
The Mckinnon and Shaw’s original approach to the role of finance in development claims that
interest rate controls inhibit financial growth (Demetriades et al., 1997). Their hypothesis forms
the seminal critique of the financial repression policies. On the other hand, arguments for finan-
cial repression stress the critical role interventions can play in maintaining stability. According
to Stiglitz [1993], interest rate restrictions may be able to address moral hazard in the form of
excessive risk-taking by banks. In the case of India, it had not only repressed financial markets,
but it also opted for planned domestic industrialization under a policy called the ‘Licence Raj.’
Licence Raj was a “system of central controls introduced in 1951 regulating entry and produc-
tion activity in the registered manufacturing sector” (Aghian et al., 2008, p.1397). The cost born
by India under the combination of these repressive policies has been well documented [Aghian
et al., 2008; Demetriades et al., 1997; Fry, 1980]. The vast amounts of cost have incentivized the
emergence of gradual, both internal and external liberalization policies in India.
During this period, India experienced growth in corruption. The critics blamed financial re-
pression and planned industrialization for rampant corruption. Many economists voiced that
internal and external financial repression in India boosted corruption activities. Under the Li-
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cence Raj, “the need for businesses to obtain a license to alter any aspect of their activities,
including to expand output or even alter product design, created extraordinary levels of cor-
ruption, as firms sought to speed licence application through rigid bureaucracy...” (Lindsey and
Dick, 2002, p.152). The repressive policies encouraged bribery and embezzlement. The rampant
corruption under repression added cost to economic activities. All of these made a strong case
for liberalization. The implementation of liberalization policies raised hopes among Indians that
market freedom could curb corruption.
Liberalization in India began in the late 1980’s. Financial liberalization policies abolished
the ceilings on the lending rates in 1988, and directed credit relaxed later in 1990 and 1992.
(Demetriades et.al, 1997). The internal economic liberalization abolished the rigid Licence Raj.
The abolition of Licence Raj and financial repression policies indicated less government activity
in the market, hence, less opportunity for corruption. At the time, an influential work by the
World Bank titled, The State in a Changing World, prescribed, “policies that lower controls on
foreign trade, remove entry barriers for private industry, and privatize state firms in a way that
ensures competition all of these will fight corruption” (World Bank, 1997, p.8). While the impact
of financial liberalization on growth is ambiguous, the majority believed that liberalization would
lead to institutional reform, hence, lower corruption (Kose et al., 2009).
(Data Source : Abiad and Mody, 2005)
However, India’s experience with corruption after liberalization was contrary to these expecta-
tions. What transpired was opposite to the long anticipation of a better institutional environment
through transparent, less oppressive policies. Liberalization brought no reduction in corruption
levels, in fact, there is evidence that corruption might have slightly increased. “Ironically, the
liberalization that brought an end to License Raj, arguably reducing corruption, has given scope
to the pursuit of personal interest, thereby enhancing corruption” (Riley and Roy, 2016).
The liberalization policies of 1991 was a substantial policy shift undertook by the Prime
Minister Narasimha Rao. He advocated fiercely for liberalization along with his finance minister,
Manmohan Singh, who later on became the Prime Minister of India in 2004. After nine years of
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liberalization, Narasimha Rao himself faced corruption charges and spent three years in prison
(Riley and Roy, 2016). This incident acts as a simile to the experience of the whole country.
High magnitude corruption scandals were reported in the aftermath of liberalization. As Shashi
Tharoor commented, “Hardly a month goes by without a new scandal emerging” (Tharoor,
1997, p. 260) (Quoted in Riley and Roy, 2016). 2G spectrum scam, Coalgate scam, The Common
Wealth Game scam are some of the major examples of high-level government corruption that
occurred after liberalization. Government corruption soon became the leading topic national
concern, and in fact, the anti-corruption stance took by Prime Minister Narendra Modi primarily
won him the 2014 elections at the national level.
The post-liberalization rise in corruption level in India sets the case for broader investigation.
The traditionally understood channels through which corruption persists must be questioned
first. India’s experience with the rise in corruption levels post liberalization suggests either one
or any combination of the following:
1. Liberalization policies open up new avenues for corrupt activities
2. Corruption levels are not impacted by repression or liberalization; it is a cultural
or traditional inclination
3. Liberalization was accompanied by confounding variables that increased corrup-
tion
4. The global increase in corruption that is unrelated to liberalization
The example of India may indicate a relationship that is worth an examination at the global
level. If my hypothesis 1 is true, India’s story is merely a subset of the worldwide experience that
has not been studied extensively. From the experience of India, this project tests whether there
exists a global pattern which may suggest that financial liberalization can potentially increase
corruption.
This project conducts an econometric analysis and sheds light on this unexplored topic. In
a panel of 76 countries over 1984-2005, I find robust and significant evidence for the claim
that financial liberalization increases corruption. The project is organized as follows. Chapter
1 explores the concept of financial liberalization and its implications, Chapter 2 explores the
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idea of government corruption and its determinants, Chapter 3 establishes channels of impact of
financial liberalization on corruption, Chapter 4 will cover the quantitative analysis and explore
the results, and Chapter 5 concludes.
1
Financial Liberalization
The importance of financial liberalization, in the global context, was highlighted towards the
last quarter of the 20th century. The financial development which took place in the 1980’s and
1990’s was part of the general transition towards enabling markets to have a more significant role
in development. From financial repression to financial liberalization, countries across the world
have experienced a transformation in the way the modern economies function. The financial
markets around the world work together as a result of financial globalization. A shock in a
single financial market can potentially cause a viral effect. For example, during the financial
crisis of 2008, the subprime homeowners who could not pay the house mortgages in Texas, hurt
the stringent availability of credit in European countries like Sweden (Financial Times, 2007).
Financial reforms went beyond the interest rate liberalization that had been recommended by
the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’ (World Bank, 1997, 207). It is a multifaceted policy that
eases restrictions on many markets. Although it has a reputation to be aligned with the western
global economic policy agenda, increasingly, the internal policy makers in the ministries of the
developing countries are opting for liberalization with the idea that it is a necessary step for the
general better functioning of the domestic financial markets (Ghosh, 2005). Abiad and Mody
[2005] through their extensive research in this area categorize scenarios that lead to financial
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liberalization into three categories: 1) shocks, 2) learning and 3) ideology (Abiad and Mody,
2005).
Economic shocks sometimes push a country to undertake radical steps to reform. A country
may resort to taking steps to liberalize their financial markets after an economic shock that
may change the balance of ‘decision-making power.’ Secondly, a country may take steps to
liberalize after careful planning and assessing the costs and the benefits. This scenario would be
considered a ‘learning’ step to liberalization. Thirdly, a country may liberalize due to the political
ideology of the ruling government. According to Abiad and Mody, these different scenarios
leading to liberalization may have different implications. For example, the liberalization that
occurs after a shock might be immediate, whereas, if it is a ‘learning’ step, then it would be
more gradual. Besides, the World Bank report on Financial Liberalization: What went right?
What went wrong?, claims that under financial repression, which was the state of nature before
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liberalization, countries experienced “poor results, high costs, and pressure from globalization”
(p.208), that incentivized the economies to liberalize. The causes behind financial liberalization
are political-economic.
Several financial crises that followed liberalization “raised questions whether financial liberal-
ization was the wrong model, what had gone wrong, the appropriate direction of future financial
sector policy” (World Bank, 1997, 207). Along with this red flag, there came an assemblage of
literature that was also set out to criticize the impacts of financial liberalization on financial
fragility, and volatility.
1.1 Defining Financial Liberalization
Financial liberalization (FL) refers to the removal of the restriction on the domestic financial
markets and domestic financial institutions that would not only allow for more financial inno-
vations but also liberalize the domestic markets to foreign interests. It is designed to make the
central banks more independent to relieve ‘financial repression,’: freeing interest rate to allow
for financial innovation and to reduce subsidized credit, and to allow for greater freedom regard-
ing the external flow of capital (Ghosh, 2005). It may include the deregulation of the domestic
markets and liberalization of capital accounts. It may also include abandoning of measures like
‘priority sector’ lending targets, the government imposed interest rates, restrictions on owner-
ship of banks and so on. It is a multifaceted measure that does not come in a package; it is a
combination of the all these measures aimed at removing barriers and facilitating integration.
Economist Jayati Ghosh provides a structure to this multifaceted policy (Ghosh, 2005). The
following is a summary of the structure provided by her.
Broadly, the term financial liberalization is divided into two categories: Internal and External
financial liberalization. The internal financial liberalization seeks to limit the role of the central
bank to supervision and monitoring while allowing for the integration of financial markets within
the economy. It encompasses,
1. Reduction or removal of controls on interest rates charged by the financial agents
2. Privatization of the banking system
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3. Greater freedom in domestic equity markets
4. Removal of financial regulatory walls between different domestic financial sec-
tors.
The external financial liberalization typically involves changes in exchange control regimes
and it can take place in 3 different ways:
1. Measures that allow foreign residents to hold domestic financial assets
2. Measures which allow domestic residents to hold foreign financial assets
3. Measures that allow foreign currency assets to be freely held and traded within
the domestic economy.
Financial liberalization and its impact are naturally of great interest to economists. To address
this question, a large amount of economic literature, both empirical and theoretical, has focused
on the effects of financial liberalization on the economy. Most of the literature on financial
liberalization has been around its impact on growth which questions the need for financial
regulations against highly risky endeavors. Increasingly, the need for liberalization has been
stressed in the development agenda of the emerging and developing economies.
1.2 Previous Work
Growth and volatility are the two parameters that have been used to study the impact of financial
liberalization. The arguments made on the effects of financial liberalization has been on extreme
ends. While some say that financial liberalization leads to positive growth, others argue that the
effect is growth vaporizing through crises caused by extreme consumption volatility. In other
words, the arguments shift between two polarities of economic growth and crises, suggesting
a trade-off between the two (Ranciere, n.d). The nature of the arguments here is not just
theoretical, but also empirical.
Many have claimed the causation between financial liberalization and number of financial
crises as well. A famous example of the destabilizing effects of financial liberalization is the
East Asian Economic crisis of 1997. Stiglitz (1998) had raised reasonable objection towards
financial liberalization when he argued that East Asian success was mainly due to a state-led
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credit allocation, a form of financial repression. In fact, liberalization in East Asia seems to
have led to the crisis in 1997. Also, the uncontrolled extensive capital outflows experienced
by the ‘transition economies ‘ like the former Soviet Union republics, capital flight suffered by
several African countries (especially in the Sub Saharan region) are examples of volatility that
is accompanied by financial liberalization.
Theoretical Pros
The arguments for financial liberalization started with seminal papers by Mckinnon (1973) and
Shaw (1973) who critiqued ‘financial repression.’ Financial repression referred to the idea that
“government regulation, laws, and other non-market restrictions prevent the financial intermedi-
aries of the market from functioning at their full capacity” (Gemech et al., 2003). Their critique
of financial repression included rules such as “interest rate ceilings, liquidity ratio requirements,
high bank reserve requirements, capital controls, restrictions on market entry into the financial
sector, credit ceilings or restrictions on directions of credit allocation, and government ownership
or domination of banks” (Gemech, 2003). According to them, these unnecessary controls led to
excessive demand and inefficient allocation of capital (Bumann et al., 2013). Financial repression
is said to have a depressive effect on savings rates resulting in capital shortages. Furthermore,
it continues the financial repression is ‘inimical to financial deepening, which is shown to have a
negative impact on growth in their empirical study (Ghosh, 2005, p.2).
For some economists, financial liberalization leads to strictly positive growth in emerging
and developing economies. This view is often based on an analogy with trade liberalization,
the benefits of which are rarely disputed (Blackburn, 2010, p1233). Theoretical macroeconomic
arguments for globalization stem from the neoclassical argument that “financial globalization
should lead to a flow of capital from capital-rich economies to capital-poor economies because, in
the latter, the return to capital should be higher” (Kose et al., 2009, p.12). The notion of ‘efficient
financial markets’ is also central to this argument. Under this assumption, “capital markets are
seen as being competitive and informationally efficient when they ensure the availability and
full utilization of the information required together, in the value of the assets as well as to
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identify the best investment” (Ghosh, 2005, p.2). Furthermore, liberalization makes it possible
for people to hold assets in foreign countries, which leads to greater diversification of risks. They
can insure themselves against country-specific shocks. Greater risk diversification, in turn, helps
reach “higher productivity and economic growth through greater specialization” (Kose, 2009,
p.12).
Some of the main theoretical arguments for financial liberalization are as follows:
1. The competition between banks created through privatization of the Banking
sector leads to higher interest rates on savings, which allow for higher invest-
ments.
2. If the financial liberalization includes capital account liberalization, the capital
inflows to the country in terms of credit and equity market investment will
increase, creating more opportunities for growth and investment.
3. Financial liberalization may include removal of financial regulatory walls be-
tween different domestic financial sectors, which would allow for greater diver-
sification of risk for financial institutions.
4. Through FL there may be an import of bank and risk management techniques,
as well as new financial instruments and services (Bumann et al., 2013).
5. A globally integrated and competitive financial system is presumed to offer
greater opportunity for diversifying risks and to incentivize to enhance and main-
tain efficiency
6. Financial integration can also spur technological know how spillover adding to
the benefits of capital poor countries.
Theoretical Cons
However, the relevance of these theoretical arguments in the real world come under consid-
erable skepticism. The neoclassical theoretical arguments that highlight the positive impact of
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financial liberalization on growth has come under skepticism. Some economists deal with this
skepticism on a theoretical level, and others look at the empirics as an instrument to convey the
argument.
At a theoretical level, economists (Lucas, Joseph Stiglitz, and others) have confronted the
neoclassical argument. It predicts capital flow from rich countries to developing countries instead
of restrictions due to higher return to capital has been famously refuted by Lucas (1990), which
has later gone on to be known as the Lucas Paradox. It is an observation that capital does not
flow from rich countries to developing countries, despite the latter having lower levels of capital
per workers.
Furthermore, Stiglitz argues that information asymmetries stemming from lack of trans-
parency in financial institutions could lead to inefficient allocation of financial flows, which
generate maturity mismatches and result in costly crises (Kose, 2009, p.14). Since information
show characteristics of public goods (non-rivalry in consumption and non-excludability in pro-
vision), inadequate acquisition of information leads to improper regulations within the financial
system (Ghosh 2005, p.2). Improper regulation, in turn, leads to inadequate risk-taking which
might be the cause of crises.
1.3 Collateral Impact
The empirical arguments on the impact of financial liberalization on growth are inconclusive.
Depending on the choice of measurements, theoretical biases, selection biases, areas of interests,
studies have ended with one of the three conclusions: positive impact, mixed impact or no
impact. Based on this, some economists argue that when the empirical results of the impact are
so inconclusive, it is reasonable to believe that other factors influence the impact on growth.
Whether economic impacts of financial integration is good or bad is dependent on a number
of context-specific factors (Blackburn, 2010, p.1322). Evidence has suggested that the impact of
financial liberalization on growth is subject to an institutional threshold (Demirg-Kunt, 1998;
Blackburn 2010; Alfaro et al., 2008). Asli Demirg-Kunt and Enrica Detragiache in their seminal
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research paper argue that the effect of financial liberalization on the fragility of the banking sector
is weaker when the institutional environment is strong. While Lucas’s argument confronts the
theoretical neoclassical model, Alfaro et al. (2008) hold the empirical investigation of the same.
In their research, they conclude that institutional thresholds play the utmost important role in
examining the capital flow from rich to poor countries. Some researchers, study the combined
impact of financial liberalization and institutional threshold on growth.“Financial Liberalization
is more likely to be beneficial for more developed economies in which these structures are more
mature, more advanced and more robust” ( Blackburn, 2010, p.1323). The argument here would
be that in a country with low levels of corruption, financial liberalization will have a positive
impact on growth, as opposed to a country with high levels of corruption.
When there are so many disagreements in the present argument, this project will argue that
when studying the impact of financial liberalization, growth should not be the primary area
of interest. The reason for this argument is because of the idea that financial liberalization
might have a significant role to play in other markets, which should be thoroughly studied first
to study the impact on growth. The government that decides to liberalize can itself benefit
or suffer from liberalization. For example, Kose argues that financial integration can generate
significant indirect or ‘collateral’ benefits that, in quantitative terms, are likely to be the most
critical sources of enhanced growth and stability for a country engaged in financial globalization
(Kose et al., 2009). The argument continues that the central collateral effects reforms institutions
in the long run (Kose et al., 2009).
1.4 Measuring Financial Liberalization
Financial liberalization can be measured in two different ways, (1) de jure financial liberalization
and (2) de facto financial liberalization. The de jure financial liberalization measures the policy
decisions and the de facto financial liberalization measures the actual capital flows. “ Many
countries have capital controls that are quite strict on paper but toothless in practice so their de
facto level of integration—as measured by capital flows or stocks of foreign assets and liabilities—
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is quite high” (Kose et al., 2009, p.11). These two measures have different implications. De jure
financial liberalization addresses the policy implications directly, whereas de facto measures the
collateral benefits of financial liberalization. This project uses de jure financial liberalization in
this project as the project tries to capture the policy implications. This will be further addressed
in chapter 4.
Bekaert and Harvey [2000] measure the de jure financial liberalization by a dummy variable as
a one time change to liberalization. This measure limits the scope for investigation by not only
ignoring the different extents of liberalization but also the continuous changes in the policies.
Rajan and Zingales [2002] measure financial liberalization through continuous proxies like the
level of financial development. This kind of measure accounts for the time-variant factor but fails
to measure policy implications directly. To account for both of these factors, an index is needed
that combines both of these two factors. Abiad and Mody [2005] construct an index to measure
financial liberalization which accounts for the multifaceted nature of liberalization by using six
dimensions to measure openness. The six dimensions are 1) directed credit/reserve requirements
2) interest rate control 3) entry barriers 4) restrictive operational regulations 5) the degree of
privatization in the financial sector and 6) the degree of controls on the international financial
transactions (Abiad and Mody, 2005, p.5). Chinn and Ito [2006] create a similar index called
the KAOPEN index. However, it measures only the capital account liberalization, a subset
of financial liberalization. Chapter 4, which covers the quantitative analysis will extend the
conversation in this matter.
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Corruption
Corruption is considered one of the oldest professions known to humanity; its beginnings can
be traced back to the beginnings of government itself (Seldadyo et al., 2006, p. 2). Corruption
is an indicator of something gone wrong in the governance of a country. No region in the world
historically has been immune to corruption (Shabbir et al., 2007). From top-level political scandal
to the low levels such as a bribe given to a policeman, corruption can take various forms and
sizes.
Corruption, with its widespread nature, is considered to be the biggest impediment faced by
emerging and developing countries in their growth agenda. Corruption is defined as the use of
public office for private use (World Bank, 1997, p.102). According to the World Bank, corruption
is “the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development. It undermines development
by distorting the role of law and weakening the institutional foundation on which economic
growth depends.” (Transparency International, About, n.d). Corruption is an interdisciplinary
issue. Its determinants, dynamics, and impacts transcend any single discipline. According to
Andvig “ c orruption is a meeting place for research from the various discipline of the social
science and history” (Andvig, 1991, p.58). Many different disciplines study corruption - anthro-
pological, economic, historical, sociological, moral, psychological, philosophical, and political.
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Research in corruption is usually multi- and interdisciplinary and includes descriptions and
corruption scandals, country cases and cross-country studies (Seldadyo et al., 2006, p.2).
By corruption, this project refers to the government corruption, and it does not refer to the
corruption in the private sector. The focus here will be mostly in the public sector and sectors
where the government meets the private sectors to carry on projects. Corruption occurs not just
in a public setting, but also in the private one. For example, a passenger on an airline might bribe
a low-level agent to get promoted to first class; a credit agency may collude with institutions to
mark up the credit scores. When these acts are still considered corruption, this project will not
discuss or consider any kind of private corruption in its investigation.
While in its essence private sector corruption might not differ from the public sector corrup-
tion, it has very different implications for social welfare. The problems caused by the public
sector corruption is far greater than its private sector counterpart. The logic here is that, if an
institution in a private sector is corrupt, as long as markets are competitive, the customer has
the liberty to switch to another institution for the same service. Corruption, when understood
in this sense, can cause a tax on its products. The customer then has the choice to switch to
the non-corrupt private firm with a lower price for the same product. Consequently, the corrupt
firm will make an inferior profit in the long run compared to the non-corrupt institution. Under
perfect competition, corruption can self-destruct. On the other hand, government and monop-
olistic sectors do not provide the alternative in the same way as a competitive market would.
Taxpayers and citizens cannot rely on other institutions to provide the service of the government
such as healthcare, public safety. This innate monopolistic nature of governments coupled with
corruption causes a bigger menace to the social welfare than the private sector corruption.
Corruption can take various forms. It may be bribery, extortion, embezzlement, concessions,
nepotism, obtaining major contracts, buying political influence and judicial decisions. Corruption
encompasses all of these acts. ’The the central problem of corruption is that it “may endanger
the stability and security of societies, undermine the value of democracy and morality and
jeopardize social, economic and political development” (UNDP, 1997, Introduction). Corruption
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occurs when institutions designed to govern the relationship between citizens and the state are
used instead for the benefit of the public official and the corrupt. Its existence is universal, and its
intensity varies across countries, and over time. How does corruption perpetuate in government
institutions.
2.1 Government Corruption
Institutional quality is essential for economic growth of a country. As Acemoglu [2004] famously
put it, “countries with better ”institutions,” secure more property rights, and less distortionary
policies will invest more in physical and human capital, and will use these factors more efficiently
to achieve a greater level of income” (p.1369). Many along with Acemoglu and Robinson argue
that institutional quality is the main reason for the long run growth of an economy. Political
institutions and economic institutions are two kinds of institutions, and they both impact growth
considerably. Some countries have better institutions than others. The factors that determine
institutional quality are several, history being a quintessential one.
How can we measure institutional quality? Different factors are used to measure institutional
quality. Most of the studies that measure institutional qualities measure different dimensions
of the government through an index to determine its quality. The most popular indices on
institutional quality will include some combination of the following: law and order, the extent of
bureaucratic delays, the quality of contract enforcement, quality of bureaucracy, and the degree
of corruption. Public sector corruption is one of the measures of institutional quality. High
corruption indicates poor institutional quality, weak governance and poor law enforcements.
Corruption not only deteriorates the quality of institutions but also threatens their existence.
Political corruption can be difficult to determine. Many confuse corruption with rent-seeking
activities where interest groups try to influence the politicians to obtain economic favors (Roland,
2016, p.510). This practice is not necessarily corrupt as long as the activities are transparent
in the legal context.What is considered to be corruption also differs from country to country
with different legal codes. The one common theme that corruption entails is that it invariably
22 2. CORRUPTION
leads to breaking the law. Under the rule of law, activities that break the law are punishable. To
avoid punishment, the perpetrators must weigh the costs of indulging in corrupt activities (the
probability of conviction) against the benefits (the pay off from the transactions). In countries
where corruption has little legal consequences, the incentive to engage in corruption will be high.
As Becker analyses, it, “the incidence of illegal behaviour is directly related to the potential gains
from illegal activity and indirectly related to the probability of conviction and the severity of
punishment” (quoted in Goel and Nelson, 1998, p.110). However, the same is not apparent
for political corruption. The electoral accountability disincentivizes politicians from engaging in
corruption. In countries with stronger government enforcement of the law, corruption persists in
somewhat a covert manner. This shows how corrupt activities will also be secretive in nature.
Corrupt systems have an incentive to be non-transparent and engage in activities without being
apparent. The more corruption there is, the less transparency will be government decisions
(Roland, 2016, p.510). Corruption self-perpetuates in the institutions.
2.2 Literature on Corruption
Most of the academic literature written on corruption has addressed either one of these issues or
both: (1) impact of corruption, especially on economic growth, or (2) determinants of corruption.
The literature is both theoretical and empirical. The earlier work has focused more on the
theoretical work. In the last couple of decades, many academics have tried to find empirical
support for these theories.
Most of the earlier work in corruption was mainly theoretical. Nye [1967] wrote a cost-benefit
analysis of corruption. Later, a new set of economists, following Becker and Stigler [1974] focused
on the principal-agent models of corruption. Some of the famous ones include Rose-Ackerman
[1975] and Klitgaard [1991]. These models looked into the relationship between the top-level
government official and the low-level official (agent) who is susceptible to bribery. Over time,
many other models of corruption came into the limelight that not only aspired to describe the
dynamics of corruption but also to mention its impact on growth, investment, production, trade
2.2. LITERATURE ON CORRUPTION 23
and other business activities. Most agree that the principal cost of corruption is that the cost of
capital for firms tend to be higher where bribery is prevalent. Shleifer and Vishny [1995] suggest
that distortion entailed by the necessary secrecy of corruption makes corruption a costlier affair
than its sister activity, taxation (Shleifer and Vishny, 1995, p.616 ).
However, not all economists believe that corruption reduces economic growth. The argument
put forward by Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968) imply that corruption may increase growth.
First, corrupt practices like ‘speed money’ would enable individuals to avoid bureaucratic delay.
In their understanding, bribery acts as a market clearing price that can increase efficiency in
an inefficient bureaucracy. Second, government employees who are allowed to levy bribes work
harder, especially in cases where bribes act as a market price rate (Mauro, 1995).
‘Grease the wheel’ hypothesis was put forward by Leff (1964), Huntington (1968) and Leys
(1965). Huntington (1968) stated: ”In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a
society with a rigid, overcentralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, overcentralized,
honest bureaucracy” (Meon and Sekkat, 2003). This hypothesis claimed that in countries with
a high number of bureaucratic obstacles, where the rules are themselves inefficient, corruption
might help enhance efficiency, which should theoretically result in the growth of the economy.
The ‘speed money’ characteristics of corruption should increase investment and by extension
increase growth. Speed money in this context acts as an economic incentivize. The idea here is
that the private individual must pay a certain price to obtain the service of the bureaucrat, just
like how he/she would pay a price to get a price from a private institution. In addition to that,
‘grease the wheel’ view also assumes that resources will be allocated to the highest bidder.
This view of corruption is misleading for many reasons. Firstly, this model assumes that
bureaucrats are economic agents whose service can be bought at a fair price. Public institution by
nature does not face competition. Hence, the price for the service provided by the bureaucrat will
be far above the market equilibrium. Besides, it ignores the enormous degree of discretion that
many politicians and bureaucrats can have, particularly in corrupt societies (Kauffman, 1997).
They have discretion over interpretation, regulation, execution and other counterproductive
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work. Therefore, corruption might exacerbate the inefficiencies in the system. For Leff [1964]
specific levels of corruption are desirable in the certain sections of the government. Economist
Rose Ackerman [1978] critiqued this argument by arguing that it is rather difficult to limit
corruption to areas in which it might be economically desirable (Mauro, 1995). Kauffman [1997]
points out that another major problem with the idea of speed money is that it assumes that
both the parties will stick with the deal with no further demand for the price (p.3). Moreover,
some resources are not supposed to be given to the highest bidder1. Also, these bribes impair
macroeconomic stability by diverting funds from treasury revenues (Kauffman, 1997, p.3).
Most of the empirical evidence tends to bear a pessimistic idea of corruption, showing very
little empirical support for the ‘grease the wheel’ hypothesis. Empirical investigation gained
much attention with a seminal paper written by Paolo Mauro [1995] addressing the impact of
corruption on growth. A ton of literature has followed addressing many variations of this ba-
sic model, where he measured the impact of corruption on growth by regressing the subjective
perception of corruption on macroeconomic growth indicators. In his paper, he concluded with
robust evidence that corruption lowers private investment. However, its impact on growth is
inconclusive in his analysis (Mauro, 1995, p.683). Tanzi and Davoodi [1997] argue that corrup-
tion may reduce growth through 5 different channels: 1) higher public investments, 2) lower
government revenues, 3) lower expenditures on operations and maintenance, 4) lower quality
of public infrastructure, and 5) lower quality of roads. Shang Jin-Wei [2000] has examined the
impact of corruption on foreign direct investments. He found a strong reduction in foreign direct
investment as corruption increases. This argument supports Mauro’s empirical findings as the
cost disincentivizes investors to invest in the countries with high levels of corruption, leading to
slower economic growth.
Others argue that it is not just the level of corruption that affects investments, but it is also
the nature of corruption [Campos et al., 1999]. While Shleifer and Vishny, and Kaufman analyze
theoretically how different types of corruption -monopolistic vs. independent supplier models-
1Refer to the Coalgate scam in the Indian context to see how bidding can lead to a scam.
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function, Campos and his colleagues provide evidence for how different natures of corruption
have a different impact on the economy. They correctly argue that regimes in which corruption
is more “predictable” all else held equal, have a smaller negative impact on investment than
those in which it is less predictable (Campos et al., 1999).
2.3 What Determines Corruption?
The empirical analysis is an excellent way to understand the cross-country determinants of
corruption. One way to identify the factors that determine corruption is to survey the control
variables used to determine corruption. There have been plenty of empirical analyses that infer
the determinants of corruption. While the variables used as determinants are up for debate, some
of the following are noted with some consistency. “Some variables have a positive relationship
with corruption like government involvement in the economy and income inequality; others have a
negative relation like the level of education, level of development and economic freedom” (Shabbir
et al., 2007). The determinants of corruption can be broadly categorized into 1) political, 2)
economical, 3) cultural and 4) judicial.
Seldadyo and Haan survey the empirical studies that have tried to determine corruption.
According to them, the most common economic factor used to determine corruption is income
(Seldadyo et al., 2006). Usually proxied by gross domestic product, it is found to have a negative
relationship with corruption. The most common political factor, according to their research, is
democracy/civil liberty. Most studies determine the higher the civil liberty, the lesser corruption.
The main reason it reduces corruption is that civil and political liberty imposes transparency.
Some studies use religious and cultural affiliations in determining corruption. For example, some
studies find that Protestant countries are more likely to be less corrupt (Paldam 2001, La Porta
1999). Lastly, judicial and administrative factors like bureaucratic wage are used to determine
corruption. Chapter 4 will extend this conversation.
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2.4 Measuring Corruption
Many researchers propose different methods of measuring corruption. The central challenge faced
by researchers while measuring corruption is its secretive nature. The clandestine property of this
phenomenon makes it harder to measure. Micro-level data entails gathering survey data drawn
from firm-level surveys. Macro-level data can be measured in two different ways 1) general or
target-group perception and (2) indices of corruptive activities (Seldadyo et al., 2006,p.4). Many
indices try to merge both micro and macro level data into a composite index. However, each of
these types of measures bears strengths and weaknesses that are unique to their methodology.
There are mainly two methods of measuring corruption: an objective measure of corruption
and subjective measure of corruption. The objective measure of corruption quantifies acts of
corruption, and the subjective measures evaluate perceptions of corruption by those who are
either confronted with it or with its consequences (Roland, 2016, p.216).
The objective measure of corruption also referred to as ‘incidence-based’ measure of corrup-
tion, is comprised of the measure based on ‘incidences’ of corruption scandals. “The incidence-
based approach is based on surveys among those who potentially bribe and those whom bribes
are offered. Through this approach, a researcher can get information on how frequently corrup-
tion occurs in various types of transactions” (The Hungarian Gallup Institute 2000) (Cited in
Seldadyo et al., 2006, p.5). Also, this measure of corruption also intakes indictment of corruption.
While one might attempt to keep an account of all the scandalous deals that are published in
the media to measure corruption, this will always lead to a severe underestimation of what the
actual level of corruption would be. For instance, low-level corruption will never get the media
attention equivalent to the grand scale corruption that takes place at the helm of politics.
The subjective measure of corruption or the general or target-group perception data gives a
‘perception of corruption’ rather than an actual measure of corruption. It brings out a feeling
of a particular group towards the injustice happening in governance. The group of people might
as well be a group of ‘experts’ in the field.
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The most popular perception-based approach is the Corruption Perception Index produced
by Transparency Berlin. Starting in 1993, Transparency International has worked towards cre-
ating an international awareness to fight against corruption. One of its contributions has been
the survey-based data on corruption. it is a polls-of-polls index, meaning, they create the index
by creating indices based on different surveys. The respondents for these surveys are “busi-
nessmen, protected journalists and experts from institutions” (Transparency International, n.d,
methodology). In addition, they do not survey the general public. For example, “the CPI 2017 is
calculated using 13 different data sources from 12 different institutions that capture perceptions
of corruption within the past two years” (Transparency International, n.d, methodology). Trans-
parency international’s effort to create the index was the first of its kind, and it has inspired
many other researchers and organizations to create a similar cross-country standardized indices.
However, the polls-of-polls survey based ‘perceptive indexes’ possess certain qualities that are
undesirable to a researcher.
Golden and Picci [2005] critique these survey-based research for its ‘inherent weaknesses’.
According to them, first, the real degree of reliability of survey information is unknown. The
persons involved in corruption activities may have incentives to underreport the corruption lev-
els. Moreover, people who perceive corruption may not be making their judgments on reliable
information. Transparency international tries to remove this bias by aggregating the data col-
lected by many surveys (as much as 13 different data sources and 12 different institutions for
2017). However, Golden and Picci continue that for countries where more surveys are available,
the perception might be more reliable than countries with lesser surveys. Also, the availability
of surveys and institutional perceptions are highly correlated with the level of growth, making
the analysis unreliable. In other words, “the Corruption Perceptions Index is probably more
reliable precisely where corruption is typically less prevalent” (Golden and Picci, 2005, p.40).
The second problem that they point out is that the popularity and the wide availability of the
corruption perception index may act as self-referential, making the index endogenous to itself
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(p.40). The more people have access to their indices on corruption, the respondents may make
perceptions from the previous year’s index.
An excellent example of a poll-based corruption index is the index provided by the Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide (ICRG), who produce data for sale. The data produced by ICRG
is used by many multinational investor institutions, academics, and banks. The widespread use
of ICRG is mainly due to their coverage both across countries (140+) and over time (1984
to present). The ICRG surveys experts in numerous institutions worldwide, collecting primary
data to create indices. Kaufmann and Kraay (2002) argue that the survey among experts are
incredibly reasonable for a cross-country analysis. Unlike the CPI produced by Transparency
International, the indices formed by ICRG is its own (whereas the former is the aggregate of
many different indices). The ICRG data also costs thousands of dollars whereas CPI is made
free to the public. Chapter 4 will discuss this topic further.
3
How does Financial Liberalization impact Corruption?
Williamson (1990) in his paper summarized the set of policies that Washington based institutions
(Including the world bank) thought would be good for Latin American countries. As he recounts,
interest rate liberalization, trade liberalization and liberalization of the inflows of foreign direct
investments formed the three out of ten primary policies (Williamson, 1990).
Pushing towards economic liberalization policies has always been one of the implicit agenda of
the international institutions like the World Bank and the IMF. Some argue that by 1980, these
international institutions, who are also the donor agencies carrying out economic and politi-
cal reforms, provided prescriptions to countries on ensuring good governance. Barber Conable,
who was the president of the World Bank in the 1990’s, emphasized four objectives for economic
growth. They were: increased government spending on education and healthcare, greater compe-
tition in domestic markets, greater integration of the domestic economy with the global economy
and the creation of a macroeconomic environment (Munshi, 2004). Financial liberalization helps
achieve the objective of greater integration of the domestic economy with the global economy by
opening up the domestic markets to foreign interests. According to the prescriptions provided by
the international institutions, policies like financial liberalization must facilitate quality growth
and good governance.
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Figure 3.1
The impact of globalization on institutional factors is theoretically ambiguous. In the ever-
changing environment of globalization, the states have to adapt to the newer challenges through
constant re-evaluation. The economic integration of the world through liberalization policies
reduces the government’s involvement in the market. However, the same accessibility can lead
to an outflow of illegal money to international safe havens like the Swiss Bank.
In this chapter, I will try to establish the causal link between the financial liberalization
policies and corruption and try to assess the directionality of the impacts.
In the financial liberalization literature, not many studies have tried to identify the impact of
liberalization on corruption. As discussed in Chapter 1 most academic studies examining the im-
pact of financial liberalization have focused on its impact on growth, while using different factors
to explain the mechanism behind its mixed impact. Research conducted by Ash Demirguc-Kunt
and Enrica Detragiache [1998] test for the impact of financial liberalization on financial fragility.
Their intuition is that financial liberalization gives financial institutions and banks more free-
dom of action, which can increase the opportunity to take the risk. The higher opportunity
of risk might lead to more fragility, but this impact can be different in different institutional
environments (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 1998). They notably investigated “...whether the relation-
ship between banking crisis and liberalization is stronger in countries with weaker institutional
environments, as proxied by GDP per capita and various measures of institutional quality”
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(Demirguc-Kunt et al., 1998, p.97). In this study, they use government corruption as one of
the measures of institutional quality. They conclude that weak institutions make liberalization
more likely to lead to a banking crisis; specifically, where the rule of law is weak, corruption is
widespread, the bureaucracy is inefficient (1998). In this way, institutional factors like corruption
have mostly been brought up in the literature an interactive factor.
The impact of financial liberalization on institutional quality has not been studied with the
same rigor. From my research, the only two studies that tested the impact of financial liber-
alization on corruption and institutional quality. Alzer and Dadasov [2013] find that financial
liberalization improved institutional quality for all variables, except corruption levels. “We sug-
gested that financial opening is interpreted by investors as a signal to provide better protection of
property rights by local governments, which results in a lower perception of expropriation risks.
On the contrary, our findings verify predictions, according to which, economic liberalization
might provide a ground for rent-seeking activities, thereby increasing the level of corruption”
(Alzer and Dadasov, 2013, p.445). The paper continues that increased interests from opening
doors might lead to nepotism and patronage. However, if simultaneous democratization ac-
companies financial liberalization, the paper argues, “these institutional malfunctions can be
prevented” (Alzer and Dadasov, 2013, p.443). This evidence supports the argument made by
Tavares [2003], who argues that trade liberalization might increase corruption, but when accom-
panied by democratization this effect might be eliminated. The authors use KAOPEN index as
a proxy to measure financial liberalization and the ICRG index for institutional quality. This
project considers that KAOPEN index instead measures capital account liberalization which is
a subset of financial liberalization. By using Abiad and Mody [2005], data set my research will
differ from Alzer and Dadasov’s [2013] analysis.
Secondly, Chandan Kumar Jha [2015] investigates the impact of financial liberalization on
corruption. He finds that some aspects of financial liberalization lead to decrease in corruption.
His evidence shows “ The findings of this paper suggest that the removal of entry barriers to the
financial sector, easing credit controls, developing security markets, and supervising the banking
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system may help combat corruption” ( Jha, 2015, p.5). These findings lead to a suggestion that
while liberalizing the economy, certain aspects of liberalization needs to be emphasized more than
the others. He continues, “the empirical evidence presented in this paper refutes their (Blackburn
et al. 2010) hypothesis and strengthens the case for liberalization” (Jha, 2015, p.5). Blackburn et
al. [2010] theoretically argue that financial liberalization may, in fact, increase corruption. Their
arguments are summarized later in this chapter. Jha’s study, therefore, counters Blackburn’s
hypothesis. Jha [2015] uses the same dependent (ICRG index) and independent variables (Abiad
and Mody [2005]). His research is the closest to this project, but the results of my project are
anti-thesis to his. This difference is partially due to the different methodology I employ in my
analysis and partly the omitted variable problem in his research. Jha’s findings and how it differs
from the result of this project will be discussed in Chapter 5.
Other studies have used variables that are usually associated with a product of financial
liberalization or as an accompanying factor in their analysis testing the effect of corruption.
Financial development and deepening are one of those factors. Levine [ 2005] advocates financial
deepening where he mentions its possible benefits to governance. Recent literature on the impact
of financial development helps his argument. For example, Altunbas and Thronton[2011] show
that financial development reduces corruption in a panel analysis using the country’s legal origin
as an instrumental variable.
Foreign aid and corruption is also a significant topic in this literature. Corruption has been
considered a significant impediment faced by foreign aid donor countries. Donor countries donate
money for the development of a particular sector in a developing country. Corrupt officials in
the beneficiary economy may divert the donation to powerful pockets or embezzle the money
themselves. Also, the leaders of these countries have an incentive to stay poorer, as poorer
countries or needier countries get more aid than its compatriots [Alesina and Dollar, 2000].
Many leaders in developing countries hence have an incentive to embezzle the money and stay
poor to enjoy more aid in the future. However, donations that channel through the hands of
non-governmental organizations [NGOs] have helped to uproot this problem. In addition to that,
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many studies have found that foreign aid, in fact, reduces corruption in the beneficiary country.
For instance, Tavares [2003] finds a negative impact of foreign aid on corruption. Okada and
Samreth [2012] show the same result.
3.1 The Channels of Impact
3.1.1 Arguments that suggest financial liberalization may reduce corruption
1. Financial repression increase opportunities for corruption, so liberalization must
decrease corruption.
The financial repression by the states before the liberalization in the last quarter of the
20th century “reflected a mix of state-led development, nationalism, populism, politics, and
corruption” (World Bank, Chapter 7, p.207). It acted as an implicit tax and added an additional
price. “If price controls are listed, market prices will express scarcity values, not bribes” (Rose-
Ackerman, 1996, p.3). Governments also chose to favor private sector entities in development
stimulating nepotism and favoritism. Capital controls increased corruption as the repression
demanded discretionary decisions by the bureaucrats and policymakers, and these decisions are
by nature, influenceable. The persistence of high corruption, coupled with limited mobilization
and allocation of resources motivated liberalization policies. Under liberalization, theoretically,
the markets freely determine prices, and private sector entities act on these prices. According
to this argument, financial liberalization must give less power to the bureaucrats and the public
sector in general hence, reduce corruption.
2. Political economic incentives of the status quo discourage liberalization, hence, liberalization
must hurt the status quo and reduce corruption
Rajan and Zingales [2003] construct the ’political power of incumbent’s’ hypothesis. According
to their hypothesis, the variability in the development of financial industries for countries with
the similar stage of development can be explained by the role of political interest groups (Arestis
and Sawyer, 2003, p.28). These interest groups are inherently opposed to financial openness as
it potentially brings competition from new entrants thereby threatening the interests of the elite
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or the status quo. “In times of crisis or conflict, the elite gains a firmer grip over its political
influence and thereby can push through legislation protecting their interests” (28, Arestis and
Sawyer). The same elite groups may indulge in acts of bribery to gain either political or bu-
reaucratic influence against policies set to open the economy. This set of arguments focus on the
group interests. The interests of the status quo would be preserving the financial repression as
a mechanism to maintain their power. Developing economies frequently experience this. “The
concentration of economic power which are characteristic of many developing countries likely
contribute to such difficulties” (Caprio et al., 2006, p.35) By the logic of this argument, coun-
tries that switch to liberalization must diminish the power of the status quo, therefore, must
experience a decrease in political corruption.
3. Financial liberalization increases competition and competition decreases corruption
Rose-Ackerman writes, “ policies that lower the controls on foreign trade, remove entry barri-
ers for private industry and privatize state forms in a way that assures competition, all contribute
to the fight against corruption” (1996, p.3). Many hold the conjecture that economic liberaliza-
tion brings in more competition, which leads to higher efficiency. For instance, banking sector
corruption is one of the most common types of corruption that acts as a tax on loans for firms
who wish to borrow. Chandan Kumar Jha [2015] argues that an appropriate degree of banking
supervision (an important dimension of financial reforms), thus, may lower corruption in the
banking sector (2015, p.2). The argument continues that higher levels of competition in the
private sector lead to lower corruption. Research conducted by Ades and Tella [1999] shed evi-
dence on the impact of competition on corruption. They conclude, “we find that corruption is
higher in countries where domestic firms are sheltered from foreign competition by natural or
policy-induced barriers to trade, with economies dominated by a few numbers of firms or where
antitrust regulations are not effective in preventing anti-competitive practices” (Ades and Tella,
1999, p.992). Financial repression reduces competition and acts as an anti-competitive policy,
giving rise to few dominant firms that control the economy. Less competition helps bureaucrats
to maintain their rent-seeking power. Competition can reduce the rent-seeking ability of the bu-
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reaucracy. This leads to the suggestion that higher competition induced by liberalization policies
might play a role in decreasing domestic corruption.
4. Financial liberalization reduces the size of the government and hence, reduces corruption.
Becker’s [1995] popular argument, “If you want to cut corruption, cut government” summa-
rizes the idea expressed by this set of arguments. Extraneous regulations require the more active
involvement of the government which leads to more opportunities for corruption. Becker in his
Crime and Punishment [1968] creates a model for corruption. Becker’s claim of higher govern-
ment spending as the root cause of corruption is a common claim held by many. Government
spending, which essentially measures the size of the government, has been evidenced by Goel
and Nelson [1996] to increase corruption. They find, “our results show that government size,
in particular, spending by state governments, does indeed have a strong positive influence on
corruption” ( Goel and Nelson, 1996, p.117). Financial liberalization by definition leads to lesser
involvement of the state. According to this argument, financial liberalization leads to a reduction
in the size of the government resulting in lower corruption.
3.1.2 Arguments that suggest the financial liberalization may increase corruption
Contrary to all the arguments above, some economists have hypothesized that financial liberal-
ization, may, in fact, increase corruption. K. Blackburn and Gonzalo F. Forgues-Puccio [2010]
theoretically make this claim. Although they provide no empirical evidence to this conjecture,
the arguments they make are qualitatively and theoretically sound. The impact of opening up on
corruption may differ for different ranks of political and bureaucratic hierarchy. They argue that
liberalization might have a smaller effect on the politicians and bureaucrats of highest ranks.
Due to the power leveraged by these top-ranked agents, it is possible to circumvent many reg-
ulations irrespective of the repressive or liberalized policies. They continue that for officials at
the lower ranks, the presence or absence of capital controls would mean very little. The primary
reasons they indulge in corrupt practices is to compensate for their lower salaries. However, in
their model, financial liberalization impacts the corruption levels of the middle-level officials the
most, who can raise large amounts of illegal money but do not possess the power to circum-
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vent regulations like the high-level officials. “These middle-ranking officials are sophisticated
enough to extract large amounts of illegal income but lack the power and influence to circum-
vent restrictions on the transfer of their wealth overseas - an obstacle that disappears when
these restrictions are dismantled” (Blackburn et al., 2010, p.1324). In this way, liberalization
can facilitate and also motivate their desire to money launder. Moreover, the money obtained
unlawfully will be sent outside the borders where the individual countries have less power over
financial transactions. Perpetrators will have an incentive in laundering the illegally obtained
money out of the country, rather than keeping it within the country as overseas, it is less likely
to be discovered and brought back by the authorities. For instance, in the case of India, corrupt
Indian politicians and bureaucrats have allegedly saved billions of US$ in European banks like
the Swiss Bank. Central Bureau of Investigation of India (CBI) estimates that the amount of
illegally stored sum of money is $500 billion (Times of India, 2012). These banks in Northern
Europe allow the depositor to save money anonymously, which helps these demands. Financial
liberalization that liberated the Indian economy at the end of the 20th century possibly opened
doors for the corrupt politicians to transfer money to safe havens like the Swiss Bank.
Other economists address topics that are similar to financial liberalization, like Graeff and
Mehlkop [2002], who examine the impact of economic freedom on corruption. Many studies use
economic freedom indices to study its impacts, but the innovation of this particular study is
that it dissects the indices into different components [Blackburn et al., 2010]. They inspect dif-
ferent aspects of economic freedom such as freedom of choice, freedom to supply any goods and
resources, fair competition in markets, the availability of reliable money, secure property rights,
and freedom to trade with others and the allocation of capital by the markets (Graeff et al.,
2002). They find different results for rich countries and underdeveloped countries. In low-income
counties, “if money could be hidden abroad or is easily taken across borders, it is much easier
to launder money from corrupt deals or other criminal acts” (Graeff et al., 2002, p.614-615).
The freedom to hold foreign currency bank accounts at home is thus shown to have a signifi-
cant positive impact on corruption. Liberalization, in this case, leads to more opportunities for
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corruption. “Financial liberalization may be seen as expanding these opportunities by allowing
funds to be taken more freely across borders where they can be concealed more easily if neces-
sary” (Blackburn et al., 2010, p.1323). This finding makes a strong case for the argument that
financial liberalization may also increase corruption.
3.2 Hypothesis
The argument put forward by Blackburn et al. [2010] forms the motivation for this project. As
shown above, the direction of the impact of financial liberalization on corruption is theoretically
ambiguous. From the experience of India, where corruption increased post-financial liberaliza-
tion, this project wants to test whether the pattern is generalizable. Therefore, I would like to
test the following hypothesis
Hypothesis: Does financial liberalization increase corruption?
The null hypothesis in this analysis would assume that financial liberalization would reduce
corruption. This project also aims to test whether the impact of financial liberalization on
corruption is systematically different for high-income and low-income countries. The succeeding
chapter will cover the quantitative analysis.
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4
Quantitative Analysis
This chapter will cover the quantitative analysis undertaken in this project. Section 4.1 will
discuss sources and descriptions of the data. Section 4.2 will discuss the methodology, and
section 4.3 will discuss the result.
4.1 Sources and the descriptions of the data
4.1.1 The dependent and the independent variables
1. Corruption:-
I have used the data from the International Country Risk Guide, which contains a variable
on government corruption. International Country Risk Guide is a country risk guide provided
by the PRS Group, NY who primarily sell the data for overseas investors like investment banks,
offshore investment companies and so on. The measure of corruption is assigned a maximum
numerical value, with the highest number of points (6 points) describing the least amount of
risk and the lowest number of points (0 points) representing the highest amount of risk. For the
convenience of interpretation, I have inverted the data. So in my analysis, the higher the points
for corruption indicates higher corruption. The interpretation of the inverted data set is more
intuitive in regression analysis, as a higher number would show an increase corruption. The data
spans from 1984-2014 for 146 countries.
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The use of this data for academic purposes began with Knack and Keefer [1995], which has
inspired many other studies to use this data. The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
rating comprises 22 variables in three subcategories of risk: political, financial, and economic
(The PRS Group, 2015). One of the key variables under the political risk is the ‘corruption
in government.’“The political risk assessments are made by subjective analysis of the available
information” (The PRS Group, 2015, methodology) which means the measure of corruption here
is the ‘subjective measure of corruption’ discussed earlier in Chapter 2.
2. Financial Liberalization:-
This project uses Abiad and Mody [2005] index on financial reforms as its primary indepen-
dent variable of interest. This index is a de jure measure of financial liberalization. This dataset
contains six different variables, one of them is ‘finreform ‘which measures the financial liber-
alization. The data ranges from 0 (fully repressed) to 21 (fully liberalized). They also include
the normalized version of the data 0 (fully repressed) to 1 (fully liberalized). Another proxy
for financial liberalization is the KAOPEN index constructed by Chinn and Ito [2016]. This
index measures the extent of openness in capital transactions (Chinn and Ito, 2006). The index
accounts for the “regulatory controls over current or capital account transactions, the existence
of multiple exchange rates, and the requirements of surrendering export proceeds” (Chinn and
Ito, 2006, p.3) in its construction. The IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and
Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) is the basis for the index. The higher the index score, the
more liberalized the countries are regarding capital account freedom. The variable ranges from
-1.9 to 2.3. They also include a normalized version of KAOPEN that ranges from 0 (Completely
under capital controls) to 1(Completely liberalized).
Both KAOPEN (Chinn & Ito, 2016) and financial reform [Abiad and Mody, 2005) are de
jure accounts of liberalization and not de facto. De jure financial liberalization differs from de
facto liberalization where the former accounts for the political decision to liberalize and the
latter look into the actual inflows of finances and capital. The principal difference between the
two is that de jure financial liberalization is driven by policy decision and de facto financial
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liberalization can be driven by market factors. “While actual capital flows are driven by various
factors (among others by institutions themselves), regulations of financial account transactions
are the direct results of political decisions, and therefore under the control of policy-makers”
(Alzer et al., 2013, p.424). The implications of these two different measures are thus different.
The de jure measure provides policymakers with the immediate consequences of policy decisions.
This project aims to contribute to the literature that is meant to help policymakers, hence, the
choice of a de jure measurement.
4.1.2 Control Variables in the main multivariate model
This project uses a set of macroeconomic measures as the control variables. Chapter 2 briefly
discusses the determinants of corruption. The same discussion continues with the following. The
rationale behind employing these variables are as follows
1. Resource Rent (Mineral rents, % of GDP, WB1)
It measures the percentage of GDP that is determined by the use of mineral resources. Use of
this variable in this project is tied to the idea of the resource curse. Sachs et al. [1995] raised the
concept of the resource curse. Ades and Tilla [1999] showed that resource abundance might stim-
ulate corruption. The idea here is that state’s who are faced with abundant resources might have
an incentive to take part in rent-seeking activities. Moreover, the private sector companies who
extract these resources usually involve themselves in bribing the state to prevent competition.
For these reasons, I have used mineral rents as one of the variables in my specifications.
2. Size of the government (General government consumption, 2010 US $ constant,
WB)
I have used the general government final consumption as a proxy to measure the size of
the government. The size of the government will also theoretically be a significant factor in
determining corruption. There is no consensus as to whether the size of the government affects
1WB indicates that the data for the variable is sourced from World Bank data bank
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corruption positively or negatively. Some argue that the smaller the size of the government,
the lack of per capita public sector service experienced by the individual, creating incentives to
bribe, which increases corruption. Others argue that the more the government takes control of
the economy, the more officials who are susceptible to be influenced. Hence, there arise more
opportunities for corruption. There are a number of ways to measure the size of the government.
This paper chooses to look at the rate of government consumption as a percentage of GDP to
get an estimate of how much the government is involved in intermediating transactions within
the country. It also shows how prominent the country’s involvement is in the state.
3. Gross Domestic Product (GDP, 2010 US $ constant, WB):-
The gross domestic product is the macroeconomic factor that indicates the wealth of an
economy. This is a useful measure to control for the income differences between countries. In
general, income would be considered to be a significant factor for predicting corruption. One
can argue that the more prosperous the country tends to be, the lower should be the corruption.
Therefore, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is included in the model. Here, it
is presumed that the wealthier the country is, the less corrupt it must be due to stronger
institutions and regulatory framework.
4. Polity (Polity IV project, Center for Systemic Peace, 2006) :-
The nature of the government is also estimated to be a significant factor in explaining corrup-
tion. The main reason why political liberty tends to reduce corruption is that political freedom
imposes transparency and provides checks and balances within the political system (Center for
Systemic Peace, 2016). The polity index supplied by the Polity IV Project is used as the proxy
for political freedom. Polity is the variable which is created by subtracting the autocratic in-
dex from the democratic index (they deem that every country has aspects of democracy and
autocracy, hence, mutually not exclusive). Center for Systemic Peace is the source for this data.
5. Trade Openness [(Exports + Imports/ GDP), 2010 US $ constant, WB] :
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Trade openness for a given country and year is calculated by adding total exports + total
imports, and the sum is divided by the GDP the country in that given year. The higher the trade
openness also known as trade liberalization is assumed to lower corruption levels. Kruger[1974]
first observed the relationship between trade openness and corruption. She found “quantitative
trade restrictions shift resources from directly productive activities to rent-seeking activities,
such as corruption” (quoted in Torrez, 2010, abstract). This evidenced is critiqued by Torrez
[2010] who claims that the result is not uniform across different measures of corruption. In any
case, sticking to the neoclassical explanation of trade openness, I expect a negative impact of
trade openness on corruption.
6. Counter Corruption Commission ( The Comparative Constitutions Project,
2013) :-
This is a dummy variable. Counter corruption regulation is one of the leading determinants
of corruption. The existence of counter-corruption committee indicates the country’s active
participation in reducing corruption. The penalties and the extensiveness of these penalties
play a huge role in an individual’s decision in participating a corrupt activity. The data for
this is drawn from the Comparative Constitutions Project which summarizes the cross-country
characteristics of constitutions.
Table 1 describes the summary statistics of the variables in use. Since both corruption and fi-
nancial liberalizations are indices with different scale and standard deviation, it is complicated to
interpret the results obtained by regressing unstandardized variables. When the standard devia-
tions are standardized (to 1), the impact is more natural to measure, as we can look at the change
in standard deviation as a unit of these indices. Since, corruption and financial liberalization are
both proxied by indices with different range and standard deviations, I have standardized these
two variables to help interpretation. The table 2 below describes the standardized variables for
both corruption and financial liberalization.
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4.2 Methodology
A first glance at the data suggests that financial liberalization has a negative impact on corrup-
tion. Graph 1 represents the scatterplot with the best fit line. Corruption index constitutes the
y-axis, with a higher number representing higher corruption. Similarly, the higher index value
in the financial reform index refers to higher liberalization. Later analysis will control for other
variables that will possibly impact this relationship.
Ordinary Least Square Multivariate Analysis
Model 1 - Basic Multivariate Model
The analysis will use panel data from 86 countries over 1984-2005. Financial liberalization is
our variable of interest and corruption is our dependent variable. Rest of the X’s in this model
are the control variables. describes the error term. I have used the functional form natural log
on gross domestic product per capita as I suspect a nonlinear relationship.
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The following model is used in the multivariate analysis.
Corruptionit = β0 + β1financialliberalizationi(t-1) + β2log(GDPpercapita)it + β3polityit
+β4mineralrentsit + β5tradeopennessit + β6governmentconsumptionit + i+it
Model 1 has two main problems. Firstly, the model does not account for country-specific
characteristics. While fixed effects estimator is a useful tool to control for country-specific char-
acteristics this analysis employs random effects. The main reason for using random effects esti-
mation instead of fixed effects is due to the time-invariant property of the dependent variable.
The assumption here is that corruption does not systematically vary over time within a country.
Since regression analysis tries to account for the variation in the dependent variable and try to
explain it by the variation in the explanatory variable, time-invariant dependent variables do
not efficiently allow us to use fixed effects. On the other hand, one might claim that random
effects model compares countries with significantly different characteristics, in which case, the
error term i might be correlated with one of the X’s, in which case the estimated coefficients
will be biased. To tackle this issue, in Model 2, I have decided to use dummy variables at the
region level. By using the dummy variables, it is possible to control for the region-specific effects
that may drive corruption. In addition to that, region dummy variables give an insight into
the region-specific differences that can help us infer more information regarding the inter-region
variation on corruption.
Secondly, the model is suffering from reverse causality or simultaneity problem. In this model,
it is impossible to separate whether the explanatory variable is impacting the dependent or
whether the dependent variable effects the explanatory variable. In this instance, if higher fi-
nancial liberalization is found to decrease corruption, then it is perfectly valid to argue that
the higher corrupt countries are more likely to be less financially liberated. This problem occurs
when both of the variables are endogenous in the system. As the decision to financially liberate
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and corruption are both tied to the political institutions2 of the country, it is tough to catego-
rize the former as an exogenous variable. Secondly, the model is suffering from reverse causality
or simultaneity problem. In this model, it is impossible to separate whether the explanatory
variable is impacting the dependent or whether the dependent variable effects the explanatory
variable. In this instance, if higher financial liberalization is found to decrease corruption, then it
is perfectly valid to argue that the higher corrupt countries are more likely to be less financially
liberated. This problem occurs when both of the variables are endogenous in the system. As the
decision to financially liberate and corruption are both tied to the political institutions of the
country, it is tough to categorize the former as an exogenous variable.
While the use of instrumental variables is the most efficient way to solve the problem of
endogeneity, its effectiveness in this particular literature regarding corruption is unclear. Many
academic papers have used invalid instrumental to treat this problem. Paolo Mauro (1995) uses
ethnic fractionalization as the instrumental variable in his analysis. Even though this paper is
widely renowned, it has been at the receiving end of critiques by econometricians. Instrumental
variables require an assumption that it does not correlate with the dependent variable, which
is hardly the most of the times. This is called the ‘exclusion restriction,’ that demands no
impact of the impact of instruments on dependent variables. The other requirement is that
the instruments need to have a causal impact on the explanatory variable. Without the strong
impact, it is hard to separate the two. In Mauro’ [1995] paper, he could not make a valid case
for the non-correlation between ethnic fractionalization and growth and investments. Hence, the
critique.
Another way to deal with the problem of reverse causality is to lag the independent variables
by a year. The lagged independent variable would mean that the variation in the dependent
variable is contingent on the past values of liberalization. The present level of corruption can
not impact the previous values of liberalization. Therefore, by lagging financial liberalization by
2The decision to liberate the economy started in the thinking of the policy makers who are affected by other institutional
factors. Corruption in inherent in these institutions.
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one year, I partially treat reverse causality. In model 1, the financial liberalization variable has
been lagged by a year. The limitations of this technique will be discussed in the results section.
Model 3 tries to estimate if the impact of financial liberalization on corruption is systemat-
ically different for wealthier countries compared to developing countries. Graeff and Mehlkop
[2003] make a similar argument, in their study, they showed that economic freedom in advanced
economies reduces corruption, but the relationship is opposite to the developing countries. I have
interacted dummy variables- upper middle income, lower middle income and low income, high
income being the reference dummy- provided by the World Bank. However, this kind of inves-
tigation is spurious as it can be shown that countries with similar income levels geographically
cluster around each other and these clusters would make it hard to differentiate between income
effect from regional effect. Therefore, to get a better sense of rich and developing countries I have
included the OECD dummy variable which would separate the relationship in OECD countries
from the non-OECD countries.
Model 4 tests the impact of capital account liberalization on corruption, where I have used
the KAOPEN index in the place of financial liberalization. Some of the literature on financial
liberalization have used the KAOPEN index constructed by Chinn and Ito [2006] as a proxy in
their analysis [Alzer and Dadasov 2015; Kose et al. 2009]. The rationale behind employing this
measure is that if the relationship is consistent between two different liberalization policies (more
precisely, one is the subset of the other), then it strengthens my finding The analysis will use
panel data from 86 countries over 1984-2005. Financial liberalization is our variable of interest
and corruption is our dependent variable. Rest of the X’s in this model are the control variables.
describes the error term. I have used the functional form natural log on gross domestic product
per capita as I suspect a nonlinear relationship.
Model 1 has two main problems. Firstly, the model does not account for country-specific
characteristics. While fixed effects estimator is a useful tool to control for country-specific char-
acteristics this analysis employs random effects. The main reason for using random effects esti-
mation instead of fixed effects is due to the time-invariant property of the dependent variable.
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The assumption here is that corruption does not systematically vary over time within a country.
Since regression analysis tries to account for the variation in the dependent variable and try to
explain it by the variation in the explanatory variable, time-invariant dependent variables do
not efficiently allow us to use fixed effects. On the other hand, one might claim that random
effects model compares countries with significantly different characteristics, in which case, the
error term i might be correlated with one of the X’s, in which case the estimated coefficients
will be biased. To tackle this issue, in Model 2, I have decided to use dummy variables at the
region level. By using the dummy variables, it is possible to control for the region-specific effects
that may drive corruption. In addition to that, region dummy variables give an insight into
the region-specific differences that can help us infer more information regarding the inter-region
variation on corruption.
Secondly, the model is suffering from reverse causality or simultaneity problem. In this model,
it is impossible to separate whether the explanatory variable is impacting the dependent or
whether the dependent variable effects the explanatory variable. In this instance, if higher fi-
nancial liberalization is found to decrease corruption, then it is perfectly valid to argue that
the higher corrupt countries are more likely to be less financially liberated. This problem occurs
when both of the variables are endogenous in the system. As the decision to financially liberate
and corruption are both tied to the political institutions3 of the country, it is tough to categorize
the former as an exogenous variable.
While the use of instrumental variables is the most efficient way to solve the problem of
endogeneity, its effectiveness in this particular literature regarding corruption is unclear. Many
academic papers use invalid instrumental to treat this problem. Paolo Mauro (1995) uses ethnic
fractionalization as the instrumental variable in his analysis. Even though this paper is widely
renowned, it has been at the receiving end of critiques by econometricians. Instrumental variables
require an assumption that it does not correlate with the dependent variable, which is hardly
the most of the times. This is called the ‘exclusion restriction,’ that demands no impact of the
3The decision to liberate the economy started in the thinking of the policy makers who are affected by other institutional
factors. Corruption in inherent in these institutions.
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impact of instruments on dependent variables. The other requirement is that the instruments
need to have a causal impact on the explanatory variable. Without the strong impact, it is hard
to separate the two. In Mauro’ [1995] paper, he could not make a valid case for the non-impact
of ethnic fractionalization on corruption. Hence, the critique.
Another way to deal with the problem of reverse causality is to lag the independent variables
by a year. The lagged independent variable would mean that the variation in the dependent
variable is contingent on the past values of liberalization. The present level of corruption can
not impact the previous values of liberalization. Therefore, by lagging financial liberalization by
one year, I partially treat reverse causality. In model 1, the financial liberalization variable has
been lagged by a year. The limitations of this technique will be discussed in the results section.
Model 3 tries to estimate if the impact of financial liberalization on corruption is systemat-
ically different for wealthier countries compared to developing countries. Graeff and Mehlkop
[2003] make a similar argument, in their study, they showed that economic freedom in advanced
economies reduces corruption, but the relationship is opposite to the developing countries. I have
interacted dummy variables- upper middle income, lower middle income and low income, high
income being the reference dummy- provided by the World Bank. However, this kind of inves-
tigation is spurious as it can be shown that countries with similar income levels geographically
cluster around each other and these clusters would make it hard to differentiate between income
effect from regional effect. Therefore, to get a better sense of rich and developing countries I have
included the OECD dummy variable which would separate the relationship in OECD countries
from the non-OECD countries.
Model 4 tests the impact of capital account liberalization on corruption, where I have used
the KAOPEN index in the place of financial liberalization. Some of the literature on financial
liberalization have used the KAOPEN index constructed by Chinn and Ito [2006] as a proxy
in their analysis [Alzer and Dadasov 2015; Kose et al. 2009]. The rationale behind employing
this measure is that if the relationship is consistent between two different liberalization policies
(more precisely, one is the subset of the other), then it strengthens my finding
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Table 4.1
4.3 Results
Results of the basic multivariate model (model 1) are displayed in table 3. Few important
notes are observed from this model: This model shows a sample of 79 countries over ˜20 years.
When controlled for GDP per capita, polity, trade openness and mineral rents, on average, one
standard deviation increase in financial liberalization index in the year before predicts an increase
of .2634 standard deviation units in corruption. This result is significant at 99% confidence. I
have implemented robust standard errors to control for the heteroskedasticity in this model. The
result is robust, and it shows that financial liberalization has a positive impact on corruption.
Model 1
As expected, GDP per capita has a negative impact on corruption, ceteris paribus. The richer
the country, the countries are more likely to be less corrupt. Polity, size of the government,
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and mineral rents have insignificant impacts, whereas, trade openness has a significant positive
impact. Contrary to theory discussed earlier in this chapter, in this model, on average, when an
increase in trade openness by 1 percent increases corruption by 0.07 standard deviation when
controlled for GDP, polity, mineral rents, and financial liberalization. This model constitutes
the basic multivariate OLS model. The succeeding models add variables to this basic model and
the results are discussed below.
Model 2 - Interregional differences
Table 4 represents model 2 with six different sets of regression specifications. The first spec-
ification represents the basic model with four variables - financial liberalization, income, trade
openness and polity. The succeeding models add a new variable to check for its unique relation-
ship. All the variables are not included in the same regression line to avoid multicollinearity. In
all of the six specifications, the results stay significant for lagged financial liberalization, GDP
per capita and trade openness. The coefficient of financial liberalization strictly stays positive
around 0.26 in all the specifications. While an increase in GDP per capita strictly reduces cor-
ruption, increase in trade openness strictly increases corruption. The last regression with region
dummies, I have specified all the regions except North America, as it is the reference region in
this model. The results are significant for the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and
Latin America and the Caribbean.
The coefficients are the highest for South Asia followed by Latin America. These results
indicate that when compared to North America, the corruption increases 1.2 standard deviations
for South Asia, and 1.04 for Latin America and 0.927 for the Middle East and North Africa when
controlled for GDP per capita, financial liberalization, trade openness and size of the government.
Model 3 - Income interacted variables
Table 5 described below illustrates specifications distributed across income levels. The differ-
ence in this model is that instead of regional dummies, this model uses income dummies and
income interacted dummies to observe if financial liberalization impacts corruption differently
in richer countries compared to developing countries. In this model, the income classifications
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Table 4.2: Model 2
 
Impact of financial liberalization on 
corruption         
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  Corruption 
 
Corruption Corruption  Corruption Corruption Corruption 
              
lag Financial Liberalization 0.260*** 0.260*** 0.262*** 0.346*** 0.259*** 0.263*** 
  -0.066 -0.067 -0.065 -0.105 -0.067 -0.068 
log (GDP per capita) -0.400*** -0.391*** -0.392*** -0.384*** -0.384*** -0.337*** 
  -0.076 -0.074 -0.072 -0.078 -0.085 -0.1 
Trade Openness 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.004 0.008*** 0.007*** 
  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 
Polity -0.009 -0.01 -0.01 -0.015 -0.01 -0.012 
  -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.015 -0.011 -0.012 
Government Consumption -0.011 -0.01 -0.014 -0.011 -0.009 
    -0.009 -0.009 -0.01 -0.009 -0.009 
Mineral Rents     0.011 -0.023     
      -0.031 -0.029     
Counter Corruption Commission     0.317     
        -0.569     
Ethnic Fractionalization         0.091   
          -0.345   
East Asia & Pacific           0.485 
            -0.453 
Middle East & North Africa           0.933** 
            -0.434 
South Asia           1.257** 
            -0.566 
Sub-Saharn Africa           0.601 
            -0.509 
Europe & Central Asia           0.498 
            -0.391 
Latin America & the Caribbean         1.039** 
            -0.413 
Constant 2.600*** 2.714*** 2.713*** 2.973*** 2.618*** 1.586 
  -0.632 -0.606 -0.601 -0.633 -0.791 -1.072 
Observations 1602 1599 1599 1084 1599 1599 
p 4.72E-12 1.70E-12 1.59E-14 1.50E-09 5.92E-13 9.49E-18 
R squared (overall) 0.3079 0.3403 0.341 0.3311 0.3376 0.396 
(Robust standard errors are described in parenthesis. * Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%;
*** Significant at 1%)
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Table 4.3: Model 3
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  Corruption 
 
Corruption Corruption  Corruption Corruption 
            
lag Financial 
Liberalization 0.213*** 0.202*** 0.396*** 0.221*** 0.219*** 
  (0.076) (0.077) (0.076) (0.069) (0.078) 
log (GDP per capita) -0.077 -0.359*** -0.333*** -0.455*** -0.184 
  (0.121) (0.068) (0.086) (0.073) (0.118) 
Trade Openness 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.006** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Polity -0.007 -0.009 -0.006 -0.016 -0.008 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Government 
Consumption -0.009 -0.014 -0.021*** -0.010 -0.010 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
High Income -1.437***         
  (0.358)         
highincomeinteract 0.089         
  (0.113)         
Upper-Middle-
Income   0.445***       
    (0.165)       
uppermiddleinteract   0.211       
    (0.137)       
Lower-Middle-
Income     0.596***     
      (0.186)     
lowermidinteract     -0.437***     
      (0.108)     
Low-Income       -0.674***   
        (0.239)   
lowincomeinteract       0.361**   
        (0.158)   
OECD         -1.025*** 
          (0.343) 
OECDinteract         0.110 
          (0.110) 
Constant 0.648 2.405*** 2.179*** 3.315*** 1.402 
  (0.916) (0.570) (0.741) (0.590) (0.907) 
Observations 1599 1599 1599 1599 1599 
p 2.04e-29 6.52e-17 3.18e-25 1.21e-18 3.22e-21 
R-squared (overall) 0.4188 0.3929 0.368 0.4071 0.3613 
(Robust standard errors are described in parenthesis. * Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%;
*** Significant at 1%)
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interact with lagged financial liberalization index. I find partial evidence for Blackburn’s con-
jecture that financial liberalization can exacerbate corruption in low-income countries, and the
impact might be the opposite for more affluent countries (Blackburn et al. 2010). In fact, in low-
income countries, one standard deviation increase in financial liberalization increases corruption
by 0.361 standard deviations of the corruption index, when controlled for all the other variables.
This result is significant at 95% confidence level. The impact is precisely the opposite for lower
middle-income countries. In lower-middle-income countries, one standard deviation increase in
financial liberalization decreases corruption by 0.437 standard deviations of the corruption in-
dex, ceteris paribus. The different channels through which this can happen in detail in chapter
3.
As mentioned in section 4.2, the impact of income differences can also include region-specific
impacts, as countries with similar income levels usually tend to be geographically clustered
around each other. To deal with this problem, Model 3 includes an additional dummy variable
for OECD countries that can differentiate the impact of financial liberalization on corruption in
OECD countries from non-OECD countries. The model predicts that OECD countries experi-
ence -1.025 standard deviation of corruption index in general, compared to non-OECD countries,
but I find a positive but insignificant result for the interacted variable. This model does not show
any signs that the relationship may be systematically different for OECD countries compared
to non-OECD countries.
Model 4:- Impact of Capital Account Liberalization on Corruption
The results displayed in Table 6 strengthens the initial findings. In this model, on average,
increase in KAOPEN index by one standard deviation in the previous year, predicts an increase
in corruption by 0.149 standard deviation units, when controlled for all the other variables. The
coefficient is positive and significant across all models. The coefficient in this model is smaller
compared to Model 2, where a standard deviation increase in lagged financial liberalization
increases corruption in the following year by 0.263 standard deviations. The smaller coefficient
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is probably because capital account liberalization is only a subset of financial liberalization,
hence does not capture the whole impact. The interesting difference in this model, compared to
the previous model is that ethnic fractionalization seems to have a positive and significant impact
on corruption, which was not the case in the previous model. In addition to that, government
consumption which is the proxy for the size of the government has a significant and negative
impact across all models. This result is contrary to what is expected as it is assumed that a
higher government consumption provides more opportunities for corruption. Trade openness
continue to have a significant and positive impact, whereas, GDP per capita has a significant
negative impact in four out of the six models. Lastly, in the 6th specification, all the region
dummy variables have a significant and positive impact on corruption, in comparison to North
America.
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Table 4.4: Model 4
Impact of capital account liberalization on corruption       
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  Corruption  Corruption Corruption  Corruption Corruption Corruption 
              
lag KAOPEN 0.157*** 0.155*** 0.157*** 0.152** 0.155*** 0.149*** 
  -0.051 -0.052 -0.051 -0.06 -0.051 -0.052 
log (GDP per capita) -0.155** -0.157** -0.158** -0.179** -0.107 -0.05 
  -0.071 -0.066 -0.071 -0.071 -0.082 -0.085 
Trade Openness 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.004** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
Polity -0.009 -0.006 -0.009 -0.013 -0.008 -0.005 
  -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 
Government consumption -0.016**       -0.016** 
    -0.007       -0.007 
Mineral rents     0.005       
      -0.009       
Counter Corruption Commission     0.36     
        -0.342     
Ethnic Fractionalization         0.851**   
          -0.336   
East Asia & Pacific           1.038** 
            -0.443 
Middle East & North Africa         1.617*** 
            -0.377 
South Asia           2.021*** 
            -0.465 
Sub-Saharan Africa           1.786*** 
            -0.457 
Europe & Central Asia           0.924** 
            -0.372 
Latin America & Caribbean         1.619*** 
            -0.379 
Constant 0.942 1.178** 0.961* 1.329** 0.163 -1.078 
  -0.585 -0.56 -0.582 -0.583 -0.784 -0.944 
Observations 2872 2839 2870 1960 2856 2839 
p 0.00000101 4.22E-08 0.00000306 0.00186 2.19E-08 2.21E-16 
R-squared (overall) 0.1178 0.1696 0.125 0.1882 0.1249 0.2493 
       
 
(Robust standard errors are described in parenthesis. * Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%;
*** Significant at 1%)
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5
Conclusions and Discussion
5.1 Conclusions
Contrary to the popular arguments made by the World Bank and the IMF economists, the
results of my experiments show a strong positive relationship between financial liberalization
and corruption. The evidence is robust and consistent across different specifications. The results
support the finds evidence for the phenomenon that was hypothesized by Blackburn et al. [2010]
and contradicts the findings of Jha [2015] which are discussed in much detail in Chapter 3. It is
clear from this analysis that the very policy that provides accessibility to diversify risk renders
convenience for corrupt activities.
The impact cannot be called a causal impact because as this project was not able to efficiently
solve the problem of reverse causality. Due to the lack of valid instruments in this literature,
this strategy could not be applied. However, by using lagged financial liberalization by one year,
it partially treats the problem.
Chapter 4 covered the quantitative analysis of this project. This project has employed 4
different models to test the relationship between financial liberalization and corruption. The
results of the quantitative analysis can be summarized as follows,
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1. Model 1, which is the primary multivariate model, suggests that on average,
one standard deviation increase in financial liberalization increases corruption
by 0.263 standard deviation units in the following year when controlling for
income, size of the government, polity, trade openness and mineral rents. Income
and trade openness can observe the two other significant impacts. While income
has a negative impact on corruption, trade openness has a positive impact.
2. Model 2 suggests that financial liberalization has a significant positive relation-
ship with corruption across six different variations of specifications. The region-
specific characteristics play a significant role in describing this relationship. For
instance, in comparison with North American countries, the South Asian coun-
tries drive up the impact of corruption by 1.2 standard deviation units of the
corruption index.The strong intra-regional differences may suggest that random
effect models which do not control for country-specific characteristics, might
measure inaccurate coefficients.
3. Model 3, the income interacted model suggests that impact of financial liber-
alization on corruption may be different for rich and developing countries. In
line with Graeff and Mehlkop [2003] evidence on the impact of economic free-
dom on corruption, my findings suggest that financial liberalization in poor
countries significantly increases corruption. However, the result is the opposite
for lower middle-income countries. This result might be indicative of Graeff and
Mehlkop’s conclusion that the ability to hold foreign bank accounts in poor coun-
tries increases corruption. Besides, poor countries have weaker legal and political
institutions. Therefore, financial liberalization in these settings can exacerbate
corruption.
4. Model 4, which uses KAOPEN index instead of the index constructed by Abiad
and Mody [2005], strengthens my evidence of a positive relationship between
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liberalization and corruption.This model shows that the result is significant and
positive across different proxies of capital account liberalization. The coefficients
of impact for capital account liberalization is smaller than that of financial lib-
eralization which is mainly because capital account liberalization is merely a
subset of the broader policy, financial liberalization.
The results of this project are broad ranged. While these results give a sense of the impact of
a broad policy shift such as financial liberalization, more nuanced studies must be undertaken to
pinpoint the channels of influence. One way to do it is to use different subcomponents of financial
liberalization as the explanatory variable in different models. The results of these studies will
be able to make better claims on channels of impact.
5.2 Policy Implications
As mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, this project uses de jure measure of financial liberalization,
which measures the extents of liberalization policies and not the level of inflow or outflow of
finances and capital. This measure is better captures policy implications. A strong and pos-
itive relationship between financial liberalization and corruption has been discovered in this
project. The first step for policymakers would be to assess what specific policies under financial
liberalization make corruption possible. Second step would be to plan and implement specific
anti-corruption policies combined with the liberalization policy. Historically, we have observed
how counter corruption policies are incorporated as a part of a larger policy shift in the case of
trade liberalization. If the findings of this project are correct, anti-corruption policies must be a
part of the financial liberalization package. Furthermore, more nuanced investigations must be
conducted to measure which policies under the umbrella of financial liberalization specifically
impact corruption positively.
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